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Abstract

In July 2012, the Australian government instituted the Clean Energy Legislative Package. This
policy, commonly known as the carbon policy or carbon tax, holds industries responsible for
emissions they release through a carbon price. Because this will have an indirect effect on
consumer costs, the policy also includes a compensation package for households indirectly
impacted. This study, building upon past work in distributive justice, examines the determinants
of the policy’s acceptance and support. We proposed perceived fairness and effectiveness of the
policy, and endorsement of free-market ideology, would directly predict policy acceptance. We
tested this through an on-line survey of Australian citizens and found that policy acceptance was
predicted by perceived fairness and effectiveness. More Australians found the policy acceptable
(43 %) than unacceptable (36 %), and many found it neither acceptable nor unacceptable (21 %).
In contrast, when asked about support, more Australians tended not to support the policy (53 %)
than support it (47 %). Support was predicted by main effects for perceived fairness,
effectiveness, free-market ideology, and the interaction between free-market ideology and
effectiveness. We conclude by considering some of the implications of our results for the
implementation of policies addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation, for theories of
social justice and attitudinal ambivalence, and for the continuing integration of research between
economics and psychology. Furthermore, we argue for the distinction between policy support
and acceptance and discourage the interchangeable use of these terms.
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The recent introduction of the Australian carbon pricing policy in July 2012 offers research
opportunities concerning the acceptance and support of this policy by Australians. This national
environmental policy directly impacts Australia’s top polluters, as they are now required to pay a
price for their carbon emissions. However, it also has indirect impacts upon Australian citizens in
the form of possible higher prices for certain goods produced by those companies. Due to these
indirect impacts, this policy also includes financial compensation in the form of a tax credit to
offset these costs for many households.

It is important to establish the determinants of this policy’s acceptance and support, as emissions
will continue rising without national policy and action to curb them. Support and acceptance of
carbon policies are a type of environmentally significant behavior (ESB), as these policies affect
the behavior of many people and/or organizations at once (Stern, 2000). Defining what makes a
carbon policy acceptable to individuals, as well as what makes an individual likely to support a
policy, deserves attention because it can help government officials and policy makers craft and
maintain policies that have national favor as well as important environmental and socioeconomic
benefits.

This study investigates the acceptance of the carbon pricing policy in relation to its perceived
fairness and effectiveness, and whether acceptance is related to an individual’s subscription to
free-market ideology. While much of the environmental policy literature assesses a hypothetical
policy or one that may be enacted in due time, this study is unique in its investigation of the
recently enacted Australian carbon policy. Furthermore, although much of the literature does not

differentiate between the terms “acceptance” or “support” this research investigates whether the
ideas of policy acceptance and policy support are interchangeable or discrete concepts.

Acceptability, Acceptance, and Support

Acceptance of a policy differs from acceptability of a policy mainly in regards to timing.
Acceptability is a favorable or unfavorable evaluation of a policy before implementation,
whereas acceptance is the evaluation after implementation (Schuitema, Steg, & Forward, 2010). 1
This evaluation can also be thought of as a positive or negative attitude toward the policy, and
thus is an attitude construct (Schade & Schlag, 2003). Schade and Schlag (2003) argue that
acceptance includes a behavioral reaction, whereas acceptability refers solely to attitudes. They
note that acceptance has been used to describe many constructs, such as “support, agreement,
feasibility, to vote for, favorable reaction” depending upon the study (p. 47).

Overall, support and acceptance have not been operationally defined in regards to environme ntal
policies. When speaking about favorable or unfavorab le evaluation/attitudes of an environmental
policy, some researchers prefer the term “support” and use it consistently throughout their
writing (Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007; Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Hmielowski,
2012), while others use the term “acceptance” or “acceptability” interchangeably with support
(Gross, 2007; Schuitema et al., 2010; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005, Steg, Dreijerink, &
Abrahamse, 2006; Swim et al., 2011; Wegener & Kelly, 2008).

Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, and Kalof (1999) identify and describe three dimensions of
support for environmentalism: citizen action, policy support and acceptance, and personal sphere
behavior. However, within the second dimension, policy support and acceptance, a description of
the similarities and differences between policy support, and policy acceptance is not offered.

Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer (2007) define the social acceptance of renewable energy
innovation, but do not distinguish social acceptance from support. They conceptualize social
acceptance as having three core components: socio-political, community, and market acceptance.
Socio-political acceptance is the most general type and thus concerns the acceptance by the
public, key stakeholders, and/or policy makers. Community acceptance is more localized and can
be examined in light of trust, distributive justice, and procedural justice. Market acceptance is
based around support from consumers, investors, and firms. Separating these three aspects of
social acceptance can help explain why an individual might view sustainable technologies or
energy policies as acceptable, in general, but not take favorably to the building of such an energy
site in their community (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007).

Climate change is both a general and localized issue, and thus it could be argued that community
acceptance must be merged with socio-political acceptance for policies relating to climate
change. The carbon pricing policy instituted in Australia affects all Australians, but not everyone
is compensated similarly, nor are industries held accountable similarly. Therefore, this project
combines these two ideas of acceptance into an overall acceptance model while also assessing

the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the policy. As we do not incorporate all three aspects
of social acceptance into our project, we will use the term acceptance instead of social
acceptance.

Social Justice and Climate Change

Environmental researchers have argued that social justice concepts, such as distributive and
procedural justice, must be considered when creating environmental policies (Bubna-Litic &
Chalifour, 2012; Gross, 2007). In addition, the political feasibility of policy implementation must
be considered as well as the need for consistent measurement with quantitative targets to assess
effectiveness (Wolkinger et al., 2012). At times, tools used to measure predicted costs and
benefits of carbon mitigation, such as carbon abatement curves, fail to accurately capture the
impact on those groups who are disproportionally affected by climate change, such as poor
communities in rural areas and disadvantaged populations in urban areas like the elderly,
children, and those living in poverty (Casillas & Kammen, 2012). Increased costs due to carbon
pricing have unequal effects upon those individuals and families with lower incomes in both
urban and rural areas, as a higher percent of their weekly expenditures are spent on goods with
increased costs.2 This is the reason for inclusion of the compensation package in Australian
carbon policy. It is important that alongside the perceived and actual effectiveness of a policy,
we also study concepts of social justice, as these ideas are inextricably connected.

This current research draws on past research in energy/climate policy and travel demand
management related to social justice to inform our hypotheses regarding the current carbon
policy. Perceived effectiveness and perceived fairness have both been linked to the acceptability
of a proposed environmental policy, as well as acceptance of an implemented policy (Schuitema
et al., 2010; Schuitema, Steg, & Rothengatter, 2010; Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2006). Both
individual factors and characteristics of the proposed policy are important for predicting
acceptability (Steg et al., 2006).

Perceived fairness of policy has been shown to be important for policy acceptance (Skitka,
Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003; Tyler, 2000; Visschers & Siegrist, 2012). Two main components
of perceived fairness need to be considered when assessing fairness: distributive justice and
procedural justice (Bubna-Litic & Chalifour, 2012; Gross, 2007). Distributive justice refers to
outcomes received from the policy and how those compare to the outcomes others receive.
Procedural justice refers to the processes that were used to inform the outcomes (Tyler,
Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997; see Thibaut & Walker, 1978, for seminal work). Judgments of
procedural and distributive justice are conceptually independent. Both the outcome and the
process used to achieve that outcome can be perceived as fair, or only one or the other, or neither
can be seen as fair. They are, however, normally correlated. Depending upon the situation and
the institutional framework of a given country, one component can be more important for
decision-making than the other (Tyler et al., 1997). For example, Visschers and Siegrist (2012)
found that distributive justice was more important than procedural justice in accepting the
decision to rebuild nuclear power plants in Switzerland. On the other hand, people may accept a
policy they view unfavorably because the process in which it was developed is viewed as fair

(Tyler et al.). Within this work, we look specifically at aspects of distributive justice, as we are
interested in both the fairness of the compensation package and holding industries responsible
for emissions via a carbon price, as opposed to the process of creating the policy (procedural
justice).

Perceived effectiveness is also positively related to acceptability, as those who perceive a policy
as more effective are also more likely to indicate higher levels of acceptability (Eriksson, Garvill,
& Nordlund, 2008; Gärling & Schuitema, 2007; Steg et al., 2006). People want to believe that
the policy implemented will be effective in solving the issue it sets out to change or protect. If it
is not effective in creating change, then why institute it? For a tax/revenue-based policy,
acceptance of the policy is also contingent upon the allocation of revenues (Steg et al., 2006).
Lastly, acceptability of a policy normally increases after policy implementation (Schuitema et
al., 2010), provided that it is perceived as fair and effective overall. These two last elements exist
in the carbon pricing policy; the revenues from the carbon price, in part, will be redistributed to
individuals as tax compensation and the policy is currently implemented. Thus, for our study, we
hypothesized that acceptance would be positively related to perceived fairness and effectiveness.

Studies do not always support the above-mentioned findings; de Groot and Steg (2006) found,
for example, that individuals did not have strong opinions regarding the acceptability of a
proposed policy to double the prices of car use, nor did they believe a price increase would
significantly decrease their quality of life. Furthermore, Gehlert and Neilson (2007) found no
difference in the acceptability of a toll charge before and after implementation. However, these

studies assessed policies related to car use, which are also impacted by personal habit in such a
way that a carbon pricing policy does not.

The influence of perceived effectiveness and fairness on acceptance of an environmental policy
may not be additive; the effect of fairness on acceptance may also depend upon the level of
perceived effectiveness and vice versa. For example, if either perceived fairness or effectiveness
is low, then acceptance of the policy may be low. These variables may not be completely
independent of one another, but if both are high, then acceptance should be high, and if one or
both are low, acceptance should be low. Thus, we also hypothesize an interaction between
perceived effectiveness and fairness on acceptance levels.

Free-Market Ideology and Climate Change

Free-market ideology refers to the belief that markets should be allowed to exist unrestrained by
government regulations. According to this view, the market will resolve any problems which
occur through supply and demand dynamics (Heath & Gifford, 2006). An “invisible hand” is the
self-regulating control mechanism for the market (Smith, 1904); government need not interfere
with regulations or policies because the ‘invisible hand’ prevents market failure (Jaffe, Newell,
& Stavins, 2005). Accordingly, if the market can take care of itself, then individuals need not
concern themselves with the environmental costs of the market. However, the existence of
negative externalities or slowed adoption of technology indicates market failure (Jaffe et al.,
2005). As the market does not account for negative externalities, such as greenhouse gas

emissions, an organization has no economic incentive to reduce their emissions. Therefore,
policies are created, such as a carbon policy, which create incentives for an industry to minimize
the externality. This is executed in two main ways by either imposing a limit, or cap, on the level
of pollution, and/or internalizing the environmental costs and allowing the industry to make a
decision on their consumption/production of the environmental inputs/outputs (Jaffe et al., 2005).

Subscription to a free-market ideology is associated with both the rejection of climate science
(Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013) and a belief that global warming is naturally caused
(Heath & Gifford, 2006). No studies yet investigate if subscribing to a free-market ideology
influences support or acceptance of an environmental policy. However, based on past findings
regarding the rejection of climate science and belief that global warming is naturally caused, and
the fact that a policy serves as a market regulation, we posit a negative relationship between freemarket ideology and policy support or acceptance. Policies that aim to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, and thus climate change, create an ideal situation to study this potential relationship.

The strength of subscription to a free-market ideology may also impact the influence of
perceived effectiveness or fairness on policy acceptance. An individual who highly endorses a
free-market ideology may not find any environmental policy acceptable, even if certain aspects
of the policy are deemed effective or fair. Free-market ideology may act as a moderator of the
relationship, only allowing perceived effectiveness and fairness to influence acceptance if freemarket ideology is low.

In sum, we are interested in how Australians’ acceptance of the carbon pricing policy is related
to perceived fairness, effectiveness, and free-market ideology. We hypothesized that acceptance
would be positively related to perceived fairness and effectiveness and negatively related to an
endorsement of free-market ideology. Furthermore, we hypothesized an interaction between
perceived effectiveness and fairness on acceptance levels, and hypothesized that this interaction
would be moderated by free-market ideology. We made no different hypotheses concerning
policy support. While support and acceptance can be differentiated, there were no reasons to
predict different relationships given the interchangeable use of the terms in the literature.3

Methods

Participants

In November 2012, we surveyed 616 Australian adults representing metropolitan, regional, and
rural areas on-line. The sample included 305 men and 311 women between the ages of 18 and
87. Respondents were drawn from a research-only panel with an incentive to be entered into a
prize drawing.4 See Table 1 for a comparison of our sample to the Australian population. A
target sample of 600 individuals was proposed before the sampling began to adequately ensure
enough participants for the analyses, and 12,000 invites were sent out within the panel. Of these
invites, 1,084 respondents clicked the link from their personal computers, and 616 completed the
survey, resulting in a 57 % completion rate. The survey was closed on the morning our target
sample was reached, resulting in a total of nine data collection days.

Measures

This study was part of a larger survey assessing Australians’ views on the carbon pricing policy,
climate change, and other environmental topics. Only sections used within this study will be
discussed, see Appendix 1 for these sections.

Section 1: Free-Market Ideology

This first section included Heath and Gifford’s (2006) free-market ideology scale. These
statements were measured on a 5-point Likert Scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to
“Strongly Agree” and included statements such as “An economic system based on free-markets
unrestrained by government interference automatically works best to meet human needs” and
“The preservation of the free-market system is more important than localized environmental
concerns.” Responses were recoded so that a higher score aligned with endorsement of a freemarket ideology. One statement was omitted from further analysis from this scale, as supported
by the results of a principal factor analysis, and in accordance with Lewandowsky et al. (2013)
(α = .77). In addition to the free-market ideology scale, two questions were also included in this
section specific to the beliefs about industry responsibility of emissions and compensation,
“Industries should be responsible for paying for the greenhouse gases that they emit, such as
carbon,” and “Individual consumers should be financially compensated to offset increased costs
on goods resulting from a carbon price.” All questions in this section appeared in random order.

Section 2: Policy Acceptance and Support

This section assessed acceptance based on questions created specifically for the carbon policy.
To make sure all participants had a basic knowledge of the policy, a brief introductory summary
was presented with facts taken from the government-issued website regarding the policy (see
Appendix 1). It introduced the Clean Energy Legislative Package and briefly spoke about the
carbon price and compensation plan.

The first question asked about overall acceptance of the policy “How acceptable do you find the
Clean Energy Legislative Package?” Participants were then asked about the fairness and
effectiveness of industries paying for the carbon they emit, and the fairness and effectiveness of
individuals receiving compensation due to increased costs resulting from the carbon price. All
questions in this section were measured on a 5-point Likert scale, and the terms used were
relative to the questions asked (for the fairness question, response categories ranged from
“completely unfair” to “completely fair”). The two fairness questions and the two effectiveness
questions were then averaged to create an index score (α = .69 and α = .78, respectively). A
dichotomous choice question regarding support of the policy concluded this section, “Do you
support the carbon policy (The Clean Energy Legislative Package)?”

Section 3: Demographics

Standard demographics were assessed in this section.

Results

Correlations between variables are presented in Table 2, along with descriptive statistics. Means
and standard deviations for each dependent variable by level of acceptance and support are
presented in Table 3.

During our exploratory analysis, we noticed differences in the number of people who indicated
they supported the policy versus found the policy acceptable. Interestingly, we found that more
Australians found the policy completely acceptable or somewhat acceptable (42.9 %) than
completely unacceptable or unacceptable (35.7 %); 21.4 % found it neither acceptable nor
unacceptable. However, in contrast to the acceptance analysis, slightly more Australians did not
support the policy (52.9 %) than supported it (47.1 %). The finding that more Australians accept
the policy than support it is odd, and conflicts with the interchangeable use of those terms in the
literature. Policy acceptance and policy support were positively correlated (r = .66, p < .01). We
further analyzed the two questions about support and acceptance separately.

We performed a standard multiple regression with the level of acceptance of the policy as the
dependent variable, and a direct logistic regression with support of the policy as the dichotomous
dependent variable. Perceived fairness, perceived effectiveness, and subscription to free-market

ideology were used as predictor variables. Three two-way interactions and one three-way
interaction between those variables were also included. Variables were centered at the means to
reduce issues of multicollinearity within the interactions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Covariates
for age, income, and gender were tested, but did not significantly affect the model and therefore
were removed from analysis. We controlled for support in our multiple regression and
acceptance in our logistic regression so we could analyze the unique effects of each while
controlling for the other. Table 4 displays the multiple regression results.

The predictor variables for acceptance accounted for almost two-thirds of the variance in
acceptance, F(8, 615) = 138.27, p < .001, R2 = .65. Perceived effectiveness and fairness were the
only two variables that emerged as significant predictors for acceptance (see Table 4).
Individuals who reported higher levels of perceived effectiveness or fairness were more likely to
find the policy acceptable than those individuals reporting lower levels.

A test of the full logistic regression model for support, with all eight predictors against a
constant-only model, was statistically significant, χ2 (8) = 465.46, p < .001, indicating that the
predictors as a set reliably distinguished between those who supported the policy and those who
did not. Prediction success overall was 86.5 %, with 89.3 % for “do not support” and 83.4 % for
“support.”

Regression results are listed in Table 4. According to the Wald criterion, three main effects and
one interaction predicted support: perceived fairness, perceived effectiveness, free-market

ideology, and the interaction between effectiveness and free-market ideology (p = .052 for freemarket ideology). EXP(B) interpretations show that for a one-unit increase in the levels of
perceived fairness (somewhat unfair to neutral, or somewhat fair to completely fair) an
individual is about two and a half times more likely to support the policy. For a one-unit increase
in perceived effectiveness an individual is about three and a half times more likely to support the
policy. In contrast, a one-unit increase in subscription to free-market ideology, results in an
individual being about one-half times less likely to support the policy.

For the interaction, the stronger one’s subscription to a free-market ideology is, the less likely
they are to support the policy—except when effectiveness is high. When effectiveness is
perceived to be high, those who are high in free-market ideology as well as those low in freemarket ideology are equally likely to support the policy.

In sum, the regression results for support highlight unique predictors for support, relative to
acceptance. These are free-market ideology and the interaction between free-market ideology
and effectiveness. Both support and acceptance share perceived fairness and perceived
effectiveness as significant predictors. Both support and acceptance are positively correlated with
perceived fairness and effectiveness and negatively correlated with free-market ideology (ps <
.05).

Acceptance by Support Analysis

As mentioned above, the data showed unexpected results concerning differences in the level of
acceptance and support. We generally expected the same people to find the policy acceptable and
to support the policy—or to find the policy unacceptable and not support the policy (with a bit of
variance due to our neutral category in acceptance). A large percentage of the sample was
“neutral” in their acceptance (21.4 %). We wondered how those neutral participants responded
when forced to make a choice on our question regarding support. Due to the different
measurement metrics on the two questions, we were able to investigate further.

Policy support was assessed within the neutral acceptance category in which an individual was
coded “1” if they were neutral in acceptance and supported the policy and a “0” if they were
neutral in acceptance and did not support the policy. All other cases were handled as missing
cases.

Of the participants who were neutral on policy acceptance, 44 indicated they supported the
policy, and 88 indicated they did not support the policy. These two groups were compared more
closely. There were significant differences on effectiveness, fairness, and industry responsibility
for the groups. Those who supported the policy thought it was more effective (M = 3.20) than
those who did not (M = 2.52), t(130) = 5.95, p < .001.5 Those who supported the policy also
thought it was more fair (M = 3.48) than those who did not (M = 3.11), t(130) = 3.60, p < .001.
Lastly, policy supporters also had a higher belief in industry responsibility (M = 3.80) than those
who did not (M = 3.53), t(130) = 2.14, p < .05.

Discussion

This study aimed to better understand how perceived fairness, effectiveness, and free-market
ideology were related to policy acceptance. Important findings arose from this research. First,
two predictors of policy support were found to be unique from policy acceptance, which along
with the differing levels of support and acceptance, suggest the existence of distinct constructs.
Second, we found an interaction between free-market ideology and effectiveness for support.
When effectiveness is perceived to be high, all are equally likely to support the policy regardless
of their endorsement of a free-market ideology. The importance of the current findings is
discussed further below.

Finding different predictors of acceptance versus support of the policy was unexpected. As these
terms are used interchangeably within the literature we would expect for them to be measuring
the same construct. In making their case for differentiating between acceptability and acceptance,
Schade and Schlag (2003) define acceptance as attitudes and behavioral reactions after the
introduction of a measure, whereas acceptability is only an attitude toward a measure,
hypothesized before its introduction. A more nuanced differentiation between acceptance and
support helps develop this argument. We suggest that both acceptance and support include a
positive attitude toward the policy, but only support includes the behavioral dimension of intent
or action. In this way, acceptance represents an attitude structure, which is passive; support
includes not only this same attitude structure, but also a more active behavioral dimensio n.

An example of policy support would be a behavior such as voting where you actively go to the
polls to cast your vote on a specific issue. Thus, your positive or negative attitude transcends
from a passive idea to an active behavior. If acceptance is more passive, then an individual may
not need to behave in any way to accept it. For example, one abstains from voting on that issue,
but this person has a high level of acceptance and, if asked, would say he or she finds the policy
acceptable. Thus, it is possible, and perhaps even common, for an individual to find a policy
acceptable while not actively supporting it. It is also possible for this to work in the opposite
direction. An individual may find a policy not acceptable, but not actively oppose the policy.
However, when asked if they support the policy they may indicate that they do not.

It may also be possible to further differentiate between acceptance and support on a temporal
dimension. Support may be a construct which spans the before implementation/after
implementation policy divide whereas acceptance is situated within the after implementation
sphere (and acceptability within the before implementation sphere). If a policy is proposed, one
may support its future implementation through political action such as calling a representative to
indicate their support or gaining signatures on a petition. One may support its immediate
implementation through voting. Lastly, one may support its continued existence through a
number of actions or intentions to act if the policy was at risk of being overturned.

One explanation for the non-differentiation of these terms can be found in the willingness to pay
(WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) the literature in economics. WTP and WTA have also

been theorized to be very similar measures; however, in practice they often diverge (Hanemann,
1991; Shogren, Seung, Hayes, & Kliebenstein, 1994). The active amount an individual would be
willing to pay to secure a change of some sort is not necessarily the same amount that they would
be willing to accept to passively forego this. Hanemann (1991) notes this divergence is based not
only on an income effect of participants, but also the availability of a close substitute. Thus, it
should not be assumed that WTP and WTA would produce similar values. In a similar way, we
suggest that policy acceptance and policy support should not be assumed to be equivalent, nor
even be thought of as the same construct. More studies should follow to test this finding.

One could argue that we found differences in support and acceptance due to measurement issues
alone. The question about policy support required a dichotomous response (with no neutral
category); the question about policy acceptance offered a scale for responses. Hence, it is
possible that the different patterns of responses to the two questions could be attributable to the
different response formats. However, for this study it was important to construct the support
question as dichotomous, to parallel the political process—a vote in parliament for the legislative
package must be either for or against the bill, with no possibility of shading support or
opposition by degrees. In that sense then, even if the present differences between support and
acceptance can be attributed to response format, it does not undermine the external validity of the
result.

A somewhat related issue to this scaling issue arises when we consider the motivations of those
who responded ‘neutral’ to the acceptance question: it is not possible to distinguish those who

were indifferent from those who were ambivalent. Attitudinal ambivalence can reflect evaluative
inconsistency, or a midway point between two opposite views (Costarelli & Colloca, 2004) and
when considering complex environmental issues, an individual may hold ambivalent attitudes
(Seidl, Moser, Stauffacher, & Krütli, 2012). This ambivalence does not necessarily indicate a
lack of opinion or indifference. However, once again, this measurement issue reflects the reality
of the policy space.

Ambivalence can arise in another sense too. Policies can be evaluated for fairness in both microand macro-terms (Tyler et al., 1997). Clayton (2000) has found that environmental groups are
more likely to base their arguments on principles concerning the larger society (macrojustice)
while antienvironmental groups focus on the individual (microjustice). In our study, when forced
to indicate their support (or otherwise) for a policy, participants’ sense of the microlevel
(in)justice of redistribution of funds to individuals and households may outweigh their sense of
the macro level of (in)justice of holding individual companies responsible for emissions. The
tension between the use of micro- and macro-justice principles to evaluate the fairness of
policies, which possibly gives rise to ambivalence, has received little or no attention in the
literature, but deserves further investigation.

The existence of an interaction between free-market ideology and effectiveness on acceptance
was hypothesized; however, we assumed that the interaction would work differently. We
proposed that when free-market ideology was high, acceptance would be low, regardless of
levels of effectiveness, but when free-market ideology was low, then perceptions of effectiveness

would have an influence. Instead, we found a different interaction within support, not
acceptance. The stronger one’s subscription to a free-market ideology is, the less likely one is to
support the policy—except when effectiveness is high. When effectiveness is perceived to be
high, individuals both low and high in free-marked ideology were equally likely to support the
policy. This is an unexpected finding and deserves more consideration through future studies
specifically. It would be interesting to examine why and when those who have a high
endorsement of free-market ideology find an environmental policy effective. One speculation is
that if a regulatory strategy builds upon market forces (for example instituting a carbon price but
allowing the market to drive industries towards environmental innovation) then when the policy
is deemed effective, an endorsement of free-market ideology may be in-line with policy support.6

This research adds to the current environmental policy literature as it assesses a recently
implemented policy. The majority of other studies of this sort assess a hypothetical policy and
intention to support that policy. This research finds that perceived levels of effectiveness and
fairness are important predictors of policy acceptance. The predictors of policy support are less
clear, as they depend on the interaction between free-market ideology and effectiveness. This
interplay of factors needs further investigation. Furthermore, it would be helpful to measure
changes in policy acceptance and support over time, especially if a change in government
occurs.7 Thus, it would be beneficial to replicate, and add to, this study in due time.

This research highlights the distinction between policy acceptance and policy support. These
terms have been used interchangeably in the literature, leading to a lack of specificity within

extant measures. Future research should attempt to distinguish operationally policy acceptance
and policy support for implemented policies. If the present results are replicated, this distinction
would then have significant implications for theories of ESB.

In conclusion, these results suggest that if Australian government officials, and other
communicators of the dimensions of climate science and policy, were to stress the effectiveness
and/or fairness of the current carbon policy, they may encourage more acceptance and support
for climate relevant policies. Along these lines, individuals should have access to effectiveness
metrics so they can also see for themselves if the policy is measuring up to its intended goals.8 It
would be productive to consider two types of effectiveness metrics; one indexing changes in
emissions; and the other summarizing the allocation of revenues from the carbon price via
compensation. The continued merging of the disciplines of economics and psychology from an
environmental perspective will help achieve these suggestions. It is our hope that by attempting
to answer our research questions, we can begin to more fully understand how Australians
perceive the carbon pricing policy. The more we understand how it is perceived, the better
lessons we can learn from its implementation as Australia moves toward its current emission
reduction goals.
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Footnotes

1

It can be argued that studying the acceptance of a policy is more important than acceptability

because of the potential consequences of non-acceptance via opposition do not exist for
hypothetical policies: breaking the law, civil disobedience, or revolt. We believe, however, that
both are important, and studying the acceptance of the carbon policy in Australia was, in part, a
result of research timing.
2

See Bubna-Litic & Chalifour (2012) for their assessment of the carbon policy on Indigenous

populations in Australia.
3

Results from our initial analysis led us to ask more questions about the differences about policy

support and acceptance, therefore, later in this paper we will discuss results based on policy
support.
4

This panel is administered by the Online Research Unit, an online fieldwork company with

QSOAP “Gold Standard” and the new Global ISO 26362 standard accreditation.
5

Equal variances assumed for all t tests.

6

We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for this interesting speculation.

7

We note that an Australian federal election is due in September 2013. The current Labour

government may lose to a conservative coalition, and the coalition has promised, as an election
platform, to repeal the carbon pricing legislation.
8

We realize that only providing information via these proposed metrics is not an effective way to

facilitate behavior change regarding policy support. However, we do believe it is an important
part of the overall process.

